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Between a Bribe and a Gift
Federal prosecutors have recently engaged in a campaign against
government corruption, placing special emphasis on bribery at the state
and local level.' Usually the Hobbs Act,2 a federal statute prohibiting
extortion which affects interstate commerce, has provided the vehicle for
these prosecutions.3 In fact, the Act "has become a principal weapon in
the government's arsenal against corruption in public affairs,"' and, in the
words of one federal prosecutor, "may be viewed as enacting a special
code of integrity for public officials."5 However, such an expansive
reading of the Hobbs Act poses serious problems. Congress enacted the
Hobbs Act primarily to deal with labor racketeering and no mention of
' See Charles N. Whitaker, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery:
Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Stuctured Approach, 78 VA. L. REv. 1617, 1648-
53 (1992) (proposing the adoption of a federal statute addressing bribery of state and local
officials); see also U.S. Dept of Justice, Report to Congress on the Activities and
Operation of the Public Integrity Section for 1990 (showing that out of 968 indictments
against public officials for corruption in 1990, 353 involved state and local officials).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). The statute defines extortion as the "obtaining of
property from another, with his consent induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." Id. § 1951(b)(2).
'See James P. Fleissner, Note, Prosecuting Public Offlcials Under the Hobbs Act:
Inducement as an Element of Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
1066, 1089 (1985) (arguing that only officials who induce payments commit extortion
under color of official right, a position rejected by the Supreme Court in Evans v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992)).
" United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding inducement
to be an element of extortion under the Hobbs Act), criticized by Evans v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
' Letter from Raymond J. Deame, United States District Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Jan.
21, 1983) [hereinafter Letter] (clarifying the government's response to questions raised at
oral argument of United States v. O'Grady), quoted in OGrady, 742 F.2d at 694.
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bribery appears in the text of the statute or in its legislative history."
Further, the Act imposes fines of up to $10,000, or imprisonment of up
to twenty years, or both,7 penalties comparable to those Congress assigns
to bribery but wholly unsuited to other lesser forms of corruption which
the statute may arguably reach.' The statute addressing corruption of
federal officials also demonstrates congressional intent to treat bribery and
lesser gratuities violations as distinct crimes." Thus, the indiscriminate
application of the Act to all levels of government corruption may frustrate
congressional intent to distinguish bribery from less culpable behavior.1
Two recent Supreme Court cases, McCormick v. United States1 and
Evans v. United States,12 have presented the lower courts with the
opportunity to address these concerns by limiting the use of the Hobbs
Act to crimes involving actual exchanges of government influence.
In McCormick, the Supreme Court announced that it would consider
payments characterized as campaign contributions a violation of the
Hobbs Act only if the elected official who received the donation had
provided an explicit promise to undertake some specific exercise of
official power on the donor's behalf." Citing the need to protect the
entrenched American system of campaign financing,14 the Court used
this quid pro quo requirement as a means of distinguishing between a
legitimate campaign contribution and an illegal bribe. In Evans, the Court
6 See S. REi?. No. 1516, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1946) (committee report on
Hobbs Act); H.R. REP. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 9 (1945) (committee report on
the Hobbs Act); 92 CONG. Rac. 7308 (1946) (Senate passage of the Hobbs Act without
debate); 91 CONG. Ra. 11,899-922 (1945) (House debate and passage of the Hobbs Act);
see also Charles C. Ruf, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the
Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171, 1175 (1977) (expressing concern
about prosecutorial usurpation of legislative role).
7 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988). The mandatory federal sentencing guidelines will
guarantee that penalties far less than the maximum will result in all but the most
egregious cases. The maximum penalties assigned remain significant, however, in that
they appear comparable to those assigned by Congress to the crime of bribery and differ
notably from those provided for the unauthorized receipt of a gratuity.
1 See Joseph M. Harary, Note, Misapplication of the Hobbs Act to Bribery, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1340, 1346, 1351 (1985) (exploring congressional intent and the scope
of the Hobbs Act).
9 Id. at 1349.
10 Id. at 1351.
" 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991) (imposing a quid pro quo requirement on Hobbs Act
prosecutions involving alleged campaign contributions).
' 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992) (holding that a Hobbs Act offense does not require
inducement on the part of the public official).




seemed to move beyond the campaign financing justification and apply
the same standard to all receipts of payments by government officials."5
By holding that conviction under the Hobbs Act does not require proof
that the official induced the payment, the Court brought the crime of
bribery squarely within the Act's confines; however, the Court stated that
it would not convict the official unless she received the payment in
exchange for an official act.6 Thus, according to some observers, "the
ruling arguably nullified the application of the Hobbs Act to the passive
receipt of gratuities. At the least, it left the door open for the lower courts
to continue to refuse to apply the act in such cases."'17
These two cases raise the question of whether a prosecutor, in order
to obtain a conviction for extortion under color of official right, must
prove an explicit promise on the part of a public official to perform some
identifiable act in exchange for an otherwise illegal payment. In other
words, is an explicit quid pro quo an element of a Hobbs Act offense, or
does the Act cover the passive receipt of gratuities as well as bribes? If
the Act extends to gratuities violations, then any time a public official
accepts a gift motivated by his office he violates the Hobbs Act and
invokes its substantial penalties. If, on the other hand, the Act requires a
quid pro quo, then it applies only to those who allow the receipt of a
private benefit to influence their official judgment on a matter. The quid
pro quo requirement leaves the punishment of conduct in which the
receipt of the gift does not lead to an identifiable corrupt result to other
statutes designed to fit these crimes. 8
All Hobbs Act prosecutions should require proof of an explicit quid
pro quo. If the courts fail to expressly exclude less culpable forms of
illicit payment from coverage under the Hobbs Act, then prosecutors may
invoke penalties tailored to discourage violent crimes against a person
who, with no corrupt intent, accepts a tip or a small gift. The quid pro
quo requirement effectively avoids this result by distinguishing between
bribery and lesser crimes.
Part I of this Note explains the definition and the use of the quid pro
quo requirement to distinguish bribery from other forms of government
corruption which do not entail the use of official power for private
gain. 9 Part H1 reviews the background of the Hobbs Act, including the
" Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1889.
1" Id.
1' Whitaker, supra note 1, at 1618.1 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1988) (the gatuities provision of the federal bribey
stute).
" See infra part I.
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use of the quid pro quo analysis in pre-McCormick cases and an
examination of the decisions in McCormick and Evans2 Part I
considers the desirability of extending the quid pro quo requirement
beyond the context of campaign contributions in order to exclude
gratuities violations from the scope of the Act 2 Part IV suggests some
areas for further inquiry left open by such an exclusion.' This Note
concludes that the expansion of the quid pro quo requirement beyond the
campaign funding context finds support in the language of the United
States Supreme Court, most accurately reflects the intention of Congress,
and appears consistent with sound policy.2 Therefore, the courts should
impose the quid pro quo requirement in all cases of extortion under color
of official right and not just those involving campaign contributions.
L DEFINITION AND USE OF THE QUID PRO Quo
A. Definition of Quid Pro Quo
The quid pro quo requirement imposed in McCormick and implied in
Evans simply means that, for behavior to be actionable, a public official
must allow the receipt of a payment to influence her decision on an
identifiable matter ' It denotes the exchange of a thing of value for a
specific exercise of official power. Proof of a quid pro quo does not
necessarily require proof of an express agreement?' Such a standard
would unduly hamper prosecution while encouraging more subtle forms
of illegal activity.' Rather, "[tihe payment merely must motivate [a
specific] official act."'8
B. The Distinction Between a Bribe and a Gratuity
This quid pro quo requirement serves as the primary distinction
between bribery and the lesser crime of accepting a gratuity under the
20 See infra part II.
" See infra part I.
2 See infra part IV.
"' See infra part H.
24 See Whitaker, supra note 1, at 1621.
See McConnick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991).
See Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1892 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concuring).
See Whitaker, supra note 1, at 1621 n.26.
z Id. at 1621.
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anti-corruption statute that applies to federal officials.' The crime of
bribery involves a promise to perform or not to perform an official act in
exchange for a personal benefit,30 or the "voluntary giving of property
for receipt of an illicit benefit."' To establish the crime of offering a
bribe to a federal official, the government must show that the defendant
knowingly offered a payment to an official with the intent and
expectation that the payment would influence the public official in the
performance of some official act.' The donor must offer the money
with more than some generalized expectation of ultimate benefit.3
Most courts agree that "[tihe crucial distinction between a gratuity
and a bribe is that a gratuity is not the moving force behind any official
act and there is no overt exchange." To violate the gratuities section,
an official need not accept a thing of value corruptly but may merely
accept it otherwise than provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty." 'Thus, 201(g) [now § 201(c)(1)(B), the gratuities section]
18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) provides in part:
(b) Whoever-
(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official,
directly or indirectly, comiptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees
to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person
or entity, in return for
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act ...
shall be fined not more than three times the monetary equivalent of
the thing of value, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or
both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust
or profit under the United States.
(c) Whoever-
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person
selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for
the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands,
seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of
value personally for or because of any act performed or to be
performed by such official or person . .. shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
30 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 796 (1985) (determining that a need exists for a more
coherent law of bribery which incorporates political theory).
31 Harary, supra note 8, at 1346 (arguing in favor of the approach adopted in
O'Grady which would require the finding of a reasonable inference that inducement
occurred).
32 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
3' See United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying 18
U.S.C. § 201).
34 Whitaker, supra note 1, at 1622.
3s 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1988).
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makes it criminal for a public official to accept a thing of value to which
he is not lawfully entitled, regardless of the intent of the donor or the
donee."36 A gratuities violation includes no exchange and involves a
lower degree of culpability. 7
C. A Hypothetical Case
A public official may misuse her office in a number of ways. She
may threaten an individual directly or coerce him to comply with some
demand. An observer could properly characterize this crime as extortion
in the popular sense, as well as under the Hobbs Act. In the alternative,
she may accept payment in return for some specific exercise of her power
even without making a threat or initiating the contact. The government
may punish such conduct under the federal bribery statute in the case of
a federal official, as well as under the interpretation of extortion under
color of official right established in Evans." Finally, she may merely
accept unsolicited gifts which were given on account of her position but
not conditioned either expressly or implicitly upon the performance of a
specific act. Under federal corruption law, this last offense constitutes the
crime of accepting a gratuity, and it is the distinction between this and
the other, more culpable forms of conduct that the quid pro quo
requirement preserves. The quid pro quo requirement removes gratuities
violations from the list of behavior punishable under the Hobbs Act.
Consider, for example, the activities unearthed in a hypothetical
investigation. Ms. Legislator has served in the State House of Delegates
for a number of years and has throughout her tenure enthusiastically
supported the State Ballet Company which receives part of its funding
from the government. Knowing of Legislator's love for the ballet, Jane
Smith, the ballet company's director, periodically sends Legislator
complimentary tickets to performances. Smith has never asked for
anything in return for these tickets, but she sends them merely to remind
Legislator of the company's value when Legislator performs her duties as
a member of the Appropriations Committee.
Ms. Representative has a reputation as an art lover. When a law
exempting ballet dancers from state income tax comes up for
36 United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir.) (involving the gratuities and
bribery prosecution of an employee of the Department of Healt, Education, and Welfare),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978).
37 See id.
38 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
31 572 F.2d at 480.
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reconsideration, Mr. Lobbyist, acting on behalf of a group of dancers,
approaches Representative, asks her to "look out for the dancers" on this
matter, and offers her $100 in cash. Representative has nothing against
ballet dancers and has spent all month accepting campaign contributions
up to the statutory limit of $50 per group in anticipation of her bid for
re-election. She takes the money. Later, after announcing her retirement
from public office and paying all her campaign debts, she accepts another
$100 from Lobbyist.
Ms. Senator becomes aware of Lobbyist's efforts. Upset that she has
not gotten her share, she approaches Lobbyist and offers her support in
return for $100. Lobbyist pays. Later, after attending a particularly bad
ballet performance, Senator informs Lobbyist that unless he pays her
$500 she will immediately denounce the company and introduce a bill to
repeal the tax exemption. Lobbyist complies once again.
When a federal investigation of corruption in the state legislature
concludes, the dancers, as well as the public, are shocked to learn that
Legislator, Representative, and Senator could all end up in federal prison.
Lobbyist, who resents Senator's threats, feels especially disturbed that the
prosecutor failed to distinguish her behavior from that of the others.
Reacting to public outcry when the facts of the three transactions become
known, the prosecuting attorney announces that he intends to stamp out
corruption in all its forms, and that in each case the officials have
"obstruct[ed], delay[ed] or affect[ed] commerce ... [by] extortion ...
[by] the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, fear, or under color
of official right. ' 40
I BACKGROUND OF THE HOBBS ACT
AND USE OF THE QuID PRo Quo
A. Extortion Under Color of Official Right
As the successor to the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934,41 the Hobbs
Act was adopted by Congress to combat extortion and robbery on the part
of organized crime and certain labor movementS. 42 For almost twenty-
five years, these activities remained the focus of the Hobbs Act, and the
first successful application of the statute to government corruption did not
- 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)-(b)(2) (1988).
41 Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (amended in 1964 by the Hobbs Act).
12 See Ruff, supra note 6, at 1174-75.
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come until 1972V' In that year, the Third Circuit opened the door to
prosecutions for bribery under the Hobbs Act by eliminating the need for
coercion.' Instead, the court viewed extortion under color of official
right, defined as the "wrongful taking by a public officer of money not
due him or his office,"'4 as an independent basis for conviction.
To support its theory, the Third Circuit turned to the common law
definition of extortion.46 Up until this time, interpreters of the Act had
relied primarily upon legislative history which indicated that the
definitions contained in the Hobbs Act mirrored those found in the New
York Penal Code.47 Because some cases decided under New York law
seemed to adopt a false claim of entitlement as an element of the crime,
a minor controversy arose concerning the supposed mutual exclusivity of
bribery and extortion. Similarly, commentators split over whether
extortion under color of official right and bribery remained distinct at
43 The Hobbs Act may have appealed to prosecutors searching for a way to reach
government corruption for a number of reasons. See Fleissner, supra note 3, at 1069. Its
primary advantage lies in the broad jurisdiction it grants to federal prosecutors pursuing
state officials. Id. Because the Act "speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to
use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate
commerce," it allows prosecutions of state officials if their conduct affects commerce in
"any way." Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). Additionally, the legis-
lative history and common law background of the Act support its application to all public
officials. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 11,911 (1945) (statement of Representative Springer)
(noting that the Act "applies to every American citizen"); see also United States v.
Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 374-78 (1978) (exploring the legislative history of the Hobbs Act).
Thus the Hobbs Act presents an effective and expansive weapon against state and local
corruption, and prosecutors and courts quicldy embraced it. See Ruff, supra note 6, at
1178.
44 See United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1211 (3d Cir.) (involving the
prosecution of "highly placed public official[s] or political leader[s]" who participated in
a kickback scheme), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
4, Id. at 1229.
4 See id.
47 See 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Representative Hancock) (The
Hobbs Act "contains definitions of robbery and extortion which follow the definitions
contained in the laws of the state of New York"); id. (statement of Representative Hobbs)
("The definitions in this bill are copied from the New York Code substantially.").
"' In People v. Whaley, 6 Con. 661, 664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827), referred to in the
Penal Code's predecessor (the Field Code) as an example of extortion under color of
official right, a justice of the peace dismissed a debt collection action, then entered
judgment and took the money himself. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction
Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L.
REv. 815, 893-97 (1988). Notably, the court focused on the corrupt intent of the taker,
an element required for prosecution under modem federal bribery statutes but noticeably
lacking from the lesser crime of accepting a gratuity. Id.
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common law 9 The Supreme Court resolved this dilemma only last year
in United States v. Evans, holding that an official convicted of extortion
under color of official right need not have induced the payment' and
effectively drawing bribery within the reach of the Hobbs Act.-'
B. Use of the Quid Pro Quo in Pre-McCormick Cases
Following the decision in Evans, a related, but distinct, question
arose: whether a conviction under the Hobbs Act requires proof of an
actual quid pro quo. Historically most courts have adopted one of three
positions. A number of circuits foreshadowed the Supreme Court's
approach in McCormick by using a quid pro quo to distinguish legitimate
campaign contributions from illicit payments, and a few implied that the
requirement may have further applications. Others declined to require
the element even in campaign cases but seemed to rely heavily on the
now discredited need for an inducement in reaching this conclusion.'
Finally, some courts rejected both the need for inducement and for the
quid pro quo, apparently acquiescing in the possible use of the statute to
reach low-level state corruption.'
1. Campaign Cases Imposing the Requirement
a. United States v. Bibby
Even before McCormick, courts which considered the issue appeared
comfortable imposing the quid pro quo requirement in cases involving
' Compare Fleissner, supra note 3, at 1071 (noting instances where the crimes
remained mutually exclusive) and Harary, sipra note 8, at 1348 (citing New York law
which treats the crimes as mutually exclusive) with Lindgren, smra note 48, at 908
(arguing the same facts could support a conviction for either or both crimes).
"' The early English cases discussed by Lindgren fall into one of three categories,
including, a) coercive extortion, as where an entire town remained wrongfully imprisoned
until paying a substantial fine, see Lindgren, supra note 48, at 839; b) false claims of
entitlement; and c) voluntary exchanges, as where officials received payment for excusing
jurors, see Id. at 843, releasing accused criminals, see id. at 856, exempting property from
taxation, see id. at 855, and waiving licensing requirements, see id. at 853. Significantly,
although some initiated with the donor and some with the donee, all the cases mentioned
by Lindgren appear to include an exchange.
Of course, had the opposite position prevailed, no need for the quid pro quo
requirement would have arisen. If the Hobbs Act did not extend to the acceptance of a
bribe, then surely it would stop short of prosecuting the passive receipt of a gratuity.
See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
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campaign contributions, for readily apparent reasons. As the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals pointed out, "[I]f read literally, the [language in cases
decided under the Act] could arguably prohibit a public official from
personally soliciting a campaign contribution."'  The Sixth Circuit
foreclosed this possibility in United States v. Bibby, a case affirming
the extortion conviction of a former Tennessee state senator. Two of the
senator's business associates had funneled payments characterized as
campaign contributions to the senator, in return for which he insured that
a certain business received state contracts.5 The court found that the
senator's office itself provided any necessary inducement but noted that
the government must prove the quid pro quo in order to avoid convicting
people for campaign activities sanctioned by custom and law.'
b. United States v. Haimowitz
The Eleventh Circuit employed a comparable standard in United
States v. Haimowitz.s In this case, the defendants conspired to issue a
liquor license to an unqualified applicant.' One defendant suggested
that the applicant make a $1,000 contribution to a state senator's
campaign fund in order to obtain the license.61 The trial court convicted
the defendants of extortion, but the appellate court reversed, holding that
the prosecution failed to show that the senator had agreed to perform a
favorable act for the applicant in return for the donation.' In the
absence of a quid pro quo, the court regarded the payment as a
permissible contribution.63
c. United States v. Dozier: A Broader Perspective
The court in United States v. Dozier" arrived at a similar conclusion
on the campaign financing issue but couched its decision in slightly
s United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 783 (4th Cir.) (concerning the prosecution
of a former commissioner of the West Virginia Alcoholic Control Commission), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982).
" 752 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. demied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986).
17 Id. at 1119-20.
3, Id. at 1127.
s725 F.2d 1561 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
* Id. at 1573.
6'Id. at 1573 n.12.
' Id.
3Id.
" 672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
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broader terms. The jury convicted Dozier, an elected commissioner of
agriculture in Louisiana, of five violations of the Hobbs Act based on an
indictment "rife with 'specifically identifiable' quid pro quo's." 5 Using
language similar to that employed in cases distinguishing gratuities from
bribes, the court reasoned that although "we do not seek to punish every
elected official who solicits a monetary contribution that represents the
donor's vague expectation of future benefits, ... [w]e must, nevertheless,
discover and penalize those who, under the guise of requesting
'donations,' demand money in return for some act of official grace."'
Because Dozier's conduct so clearly involved a series of exchanges, the
court expressly declined to adopt the broader reading of the statute found
in United States v. Trotta,' a Second Circuit decision holding that a
quid pro quo did not make up an essential element of the crime.' In
fact, the Fifth Circuit implicitly questioned such a broad view when it
stated that Trotta, whom the court convicted without a specific
identification of the anticipated benefit, "may have been operating on the
margin of the law."'  Although the Dozier court based much of its
argument on the need to separate necessary campaign solicitations from
criminal behavior," many of the transactions involved in the case
obviously represented private payoffs.7" Therefore, the case may have
had wider implications for non-campaign as well as campaign cases.
2. The Quid Pro Quo as a Subset of Inducement
The Second Circuit, in United States v. O'Grady,' rejected the quid
pro quo requirement in a non-campaign context, and it instead turned to
the element of inducement to address many of the concerns about over-
inclusiveness raised by other courts.' The trial court convicted Edward
O'Grady, a subway inspector, of extortion under color of official right
after finding that he received numerous meals, golf trips, and other
Id. at 540 n4.
Id. at 537.
6 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975) (concerning a town commissioner of public works
who received payments for engineering contracts), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
Dozier, 672 F.2d at 540.
"Id.
7 Id. at 537.
7' Id. at 538.





entertainment from companies whose work he inspected.74 Citing
language in earlier cases which viewed the misuse of public office as the
essence of a Hobbs Act violation, the court refused to convict an official
for the passive acceptance of benefits." According to the court, to do
so would allow any gift, no matter how inconsequential, to form the basis
of a federal prosecution.' After an examination of federal bribery and
gratuities laws, the court determined that the latter crime fell beyond the
reach of the Hobbs Act.' The court relied upon a showing of
inducement, rather than prosecutorial discretion, to maintain the
distinction78 and noted that while a specific quid pro quo could prove
inducement, other circumstantial evidence would suffice as well.79
Because of subsequent rulings, most specifically Evans, the issues that
concerned the O'Grady court remain very much debated today, with the
quid pro quo requirement providing one of the few remaining means by
which to address them. Therefore, one should not read the O'Grady case
as a strong rejection of the quid pro quo. In fact, some have interpreted
O'Grady to impose a quid pro quo requirement whenever the official has
not received "substantial benefits."'8
3. Rejection of the Quid Pro Quo
a. United States v. Holzer
Prior to O'Grady, the Second Circuit had maintained that not only did
extortion under color of official right not require a quid pro quo, but also
that it "matters not whether [the defendant] induced payments to perform
his duties or not to perform his duties."81 A few courts picked up on this
idea, arguing that "it is extortion if the official knows that the bribe, gift,
or other favor is motivated by a hope that it will influence him in the
exercise of his office and if, knowing this, he accepts the bribe."' Used
74 Id. at 685.
7s Id. at 687.
76 Id. at 693.
77 d. at 691.
' Id. ("Thus, extortion under color of official right begins with the public official,
not with the gratuitous actions of another.').
Id. at 691-92.
o See United States v. Campo, 774 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1985) (Pierce, J.,
concurring) (concerning the prosecution of a New York City policem=n).
" United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting United States
v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975)).




in this sense, the word "bribe" encompasses any thing of value given to
a public official and not only those given under the conditions described
in the federal bribery statute.83 The Seventh Circuit thereby dispensed
with the need for an agreement between the two parties and allowed a
conviction even where the purpose or effects of the gift appeared very
unclear.'
b. United States v. Barber
The Fourth Circuit provided the most expansive reading of the statute
in United States v. Barber.' Barber, a former commissioner of the West
Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, received substantial
amounts of free liquor from various companies." The court recognized
that "the line is a fine one between an altogether 'voluntary'payment and
the conferring of a benefit on someone who holds a particular public
office in fear of retaliation or in expectation of benefit."'  At trial,
"there was not much direct evidence as to why the liquor companies
continued to authorize the withdrawals of liquor by the defendant.""
Nevertheless, the court upheld the conviction, essentially deciding that a
reason for such substantial gifts must exist.89 Because no one could
explain the basis for the gifts, the "conclusion is irresistible that... the
'gift'was not a gift, but, rather, was in return for favors."" The standard
articulated in Barber implies, rather than proves, the quid pro quo.91
Courts approached the quid pro quo issue in a variety of ways. A
majority agreed that the element addressed the need to separate campaign
contributions from criminal behavior.' Others relied on inducement,
with the quid pro quo as a subset, to perform this function 3 A few
remanded on other grounds, 484 U.S. 807 (1987); see also United States v. Garner, 837
F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1987) (involving gifts to sewer inspectors), cert denied, 486 U.S.
1035 (1988).
' See, e.g., Garner, 837 F.2d at 1422 (explaining that money paid to defendants
because industry understood that nonpayment would lead to increased difficulty in doing
business constitutes a bribe).
4 Id.







n See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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opinions expressed concern about other issues, such as the prosecution of
the receipt of certain de minimis benefits under a relatively harsh penal
statute," but for the most part, courts remained focused on statutory
interpretation. With the foundation thus laid, the Supreme Court first
chose to address the quid pro quo requirement in the context of campaign
contributions made to a state legislator.
4. McCormick v. United States
McCormick v. United States concerned the conduct of a member of
the West Virginia House of Delegates.95 McCormick represented a
district which suffered from a chronic shortage of doctors, and he had
steadfastly supported a program which allowed foreign doctors to practice
in West Virginia under temporary permits despite their having repeatedly
failed state licensing exams.! When other legislators questioned the
need for such a program, several of these doctors hired a lobbyist to work
for its extension, an objective obtained through the passage of a bill
sponsored by McCormick.97 Shortly thereafter, the lobbyist met with
McCormick to discuss the possibility of introducing legislation which
would grant the doctors a permanent license by virtue of their experience
instead of by passing the licensing exam; McCormick agreed to sponsor
such a bill.9"
Sometime after this discussion, McCormick complained to the
lobbyist that while he had spent considerable sums of his own money to
finance his 1984 re-election campaign, he had not heard anything from
the foreign doctors." The lobbyist said that he would see what he could
do, and later he delivered an envelope containing $900 in cash to
McCormick."° McCormick continued to receive payments throughout
the campaign, although he never reported any of these as campaign
contributions. The final payment came two weeks after the enactment of
a bill, sponsored and supported on the floor by McCormick, allowing




" See, e.g., United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 693-94 (2d Cir. 1984), criticized
by Evans v. United States, 112 S. CL 1881 (1992).









Based upon this behavior, a grand jury indicted McCormick on five
counts of violating the Hobbs Act by extortion under color of official
right and one count of filing a false income tax return." After hearing
instructions which attempted to distinguish between "voluntary" campaign
contributions and those made with the expectation of benefit, the jury
convicted McCormick on the first Hobbs Act count but could not reach
a verdict on the other charges. 3 The district court declared a mistrial
on those counts."°
The court of appeals affirmed, noting that while the receipt of a
voluntary campaign contribution did not violate the Hobbs Act, the
circumstances differ when neither party intends the payment as a
legitimate contribution. 5 In the latter instance, the court holds the
recipient to the same standard as a non-elected official. The court may
convict him without proof that he has agreed to grant some specific favor
in return for the benefit paid.1" The court listed seven factors which
would point to an illegitimate campaign contribution. 07 After reviewing
the evidence, it concluded that a reasonable jury could characterize the
payments in this case as extortionate!"
The Supreme Court reversed. Expressly limiting its holding to
payments described as campaign contributions," the Court found that
1 Id. at 261.
1"3 Id. at 264-65.
'
04 Id. at 265.
103 Id.
1
" Id. at 266.
"7 IL at 269 n.7. The factors used by the appellate court include: (1) whether the
money was recorded as a campaign contribution by the donor, (2) whether the money was
reported as a campaign contribution by the payee; (3) whether the payment was in cash;
(4) whether it was delivered personally to the official or to his campaign; (5) whether the
official acted in his official capacity in supporting legislation which would benefit the
payor near the time of the payment; (6) whether the official had supported Simil
legislation before the payment; and (7) whether the official solicited the payment. Id.
10 Id. at 270.
o' Despite the facts that West Virginia law forbids campaign contributions from
individuals in excess of $50 per person and that he never reported them as such,
McCormick maintained that the payments represented campaign contributions and the
courts acquiesced in this characterization. Id. at 260. The standard used to determine
whether the defendant has met the threshold for calling into play the quid pro quo
requirement presents one of the more unusual aspects of the case. The Court rejected the
factors used by the court of appeals to distinguish outright bribes from legitimate
contributions and instead substituted a test based on the intent of the parties. Id. at 271.
Yet the Court never explained how the proof of this intent would differ materially from
the factors it had dismissed and apparently treated any claimed campaign contribution as
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the receipt of such payments violates the Hobbs Act "only if the
payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the
official to perform or not to perform an official act..... The Court
opined that the factors used by the court of appeals could not adequately
reconcile the need to eradicate corruption with the need to finance
political campaigns. The court stated that "[s]erving constituents and
supporting legislation that will benefit the district and individuals and
groups therein is the everyday business of a legislator."1"' Therefore, as
long as the current system of public financing remains in place,
legislators must continue to accept contributions. To hold a legislator
liable for supporting legislation which furthers the interests of constituents
shortly before or after receiving contributions from them would punish
her for conduct which she largely cannot avoid." The Court concluded
that the quid pro quo requirement allows for punishment of truly
extortionate conduct while preserving the current system of campaign
financing."3
While concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia expressed
reservations about the quid pro quo requirement, believing it to represent
a necessary response to practical exigencies but without textual or
historical basis."4 After briefly reviewing the history of the Act, Scalia
suggested a narrower reading of the statute which would find receipt of
a legitimate donation without inquiring into the basis for the claim.
The alternative appears to be to accept the parties' characterization of the transaction,
which will almost invariably describe an intended contribution in order to trigger the
additional quid pro quo requirement and hopefully escape conviction. Perhaps the Court
hesitated to make serious consequences like a Hobbs Act conviction hinge on compliance
with campaign reporting requirements, which carry much smaller penalties. However,
accepting the parties' description, as the Court seemed inclined to do, comes near to
applying the quid pro quo requirement in all cases involving elected officials, absent
extraordinary circumstances such as an announced intention not to rum again or a defeat
in a prior election. Looking at the hypothetical case introduced at the beginning of the
Note, it appears almost certain that Representative's receipt of the contribution during the
campaign would receive the benefit of the quid pro quo standard, but it seems possible
that the later payment would enjoy the same treatment, although the circumstances
surrounding the payments differ in significant ways. If the Court continues to use this
standard, it should clarify the situations in which the standard applies. Of course, a
blanket imposition of the quid pro quo in all Hobbs Act prosecutions would eliminate the
problem.
1o Id. at 273.
... Id. at 272.
112 Id.
0 Id.
114 Id. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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a voluntary payment extortionate only if a pretense to entitlement
occurred."'5 Since the parties had not addressed this possibility, Scalia
stopped short of endorsing it."6 Nevertheless, he obviously entertained
reservations about further broadening the scope of the statute."7
The dissenters, represented by Justice Stevens, objected primarily on
procedural grounds."' Since McCormick did not present an express
objection to the instructions as required under Rule 30 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Stevens opined that the Court must confirm the
conviction."9 He agreed, however, that "to prove a violation of the
Hobbs Act... it is essential that the payment in question be contingent
on a mutual understanding that the motivation for the payment is the
payer's desire to avoid a specific threatened harm or to obtain a promised
benefit."'' 0 Stevens clarified, however, that proof of actual fulfillment
of the quid pro quo need not exist if the prosecutor can show the making
of the promise, and that such proof has only evidentiary significance.21
Thus, all three opinions support the imposition of the quid pro quo
requirement in the campaign financing context, without reaching the issue
of broader interpretation.
5. Evans v. United States
In Evans v. United States,"2 the Court returned to the "under color
of official right" language, this time focusing on the element of
inducement. In Evans, the petitioner had served as an elected member of
the Board of Commissioners of DeKalb County, Georgia." An FBI
agent posing as a real estate developer approached Evans and sought his
assistance in rezoning a twenty-five acre tract of land." After
discussion, the agent gave Evans a $1,000 check payable to Evans'
campaign, which Evans reported on the appropriate campaign financing
form, and $7,000 in cash, which Evans did not report." The court of
appeals upheld Evans' conviction, stating that the "passive acceptance of
". Id. at 279.
16 Id. at 277.
117 Id.
1 Id. at 280 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
t9 Id.
' Id. at 283.
121 Id.
12 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).





a benefit is sufficient to form the basis of a Hobbs Act violation if the
official knows that he is being offered the payment in exchange for a
specific requested exercise of official power." '126 The Supreme Court
assumed that Evans accepted the cash knowing that the donor intended
it to guarantee his support on the rezoning petition and that the
acceptance constituted an "implicit promise to use his official position to
serve the interests of the bribe-giver.'2 7 The Court upheld Evans'
conviction, finding that an "official need not take any specific action to
induce the offering of the benefit" in order to violate the Act."2s
Instead, the Court held that the "Government need only show that a
public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled,
knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts."' 3
Although the Court commented that the instruction given satisfied the
quid pro quo requirement of McCormick," it never expressly indicated
that it equated the $7,000 cash payment with the $1,000 check which
clearly represented a campaign contribution. Justice Kennedy addressed
this issue more directly, concluding that the language used by the
majority "requires a quid pro quo as an element of the Government case
in [any] prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1951'' 3' and not just in those
involving purported campaign contributions. Kennedy stated that this
reading was consistent with the opinion of the Court, as well as with the
statute's language and history. He further argued that the parties "need not
state the quid pro quo requirement in express terms"" because the jury
could infer the necessary agreement from the surrounding circumstanc-
es." The dissenting opinion did not support a quid pro quo require-
ment in all cases, believing it to represent a practical response to the
campaign financing dilemma but arguing for a narrow reading of
extortion under color of official right which would make it unnecessary
in other situations." However, the dissent also read the majority
opinion as imposing such a requirement.135
Thus, after Evans, four Justices believed that the government must
demonstrate a quid pro quo in all cases involving extortion under color




United States v. McCormick, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
131 Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1892 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
m Id.
"'Id.




of official right, while the opinion joined by four others included
language which could arguably support such an inference. Evans also
affects the issue in another way. With the elimination of the inducement
element, the quid pro quo remains the only way to distinguish serious
crimes such as extortion and bribery from less culpable conduct. Courts
which dismissed the need for the quid pro quo and relied upon
inducement to excuse certain de minimi payments's must now
reevaluate their decisions in light of those same concerns. Therefore,
although the holding in Evans limited itself to the need for inducement,
the decision injects a new element of uncertainty into the quid pro quo
arena.
1IM AN EXPLICIT QuiD PRo Quo SHOULD
BE AN ELEMENT OF ALL HOBBS ACT VIOLATIONS
The Supreme Court should continue down the path laid out in
McCormick and Evans and impose a quid pro quo requirement on all
prosecutions under the Hobbs Act. The language of Evans invites such
a conclusion.' 7  While the legislative history and common law
background of the Act lend only incidental support at best, they do not
mandate a broader reading." Most importantly, such a requirement
would best reflect congressional intent in light of its overall scheme
addressing government corruption."9 Important policy considerations
also support this view."' Finally, the requisite standard of proof should
not prove any more unmanageable than that found in other areas of the
criminal law. 141
A. Evans Opens the Door to This Interpretation
According to four Supreme Court Justices, the language in Evans
imposes a quid pro quo requirement on all Hobbs Act prosecutions. The
relevant passage states, "We hold today that the government need only
show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not
' See United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 691-94 (2d Cir. 1984), criticized by
Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
,, See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
at See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 152-79 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
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entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official
acts. 1 4 2  When the dissent protested that "[t]his quid pro quo
requirement is simply made up," 43 the majority did not deny having
created the restriction. Rather the members of the majority merely refuted
the charge by arguing that "the common-law tradition!' supports the
requirement.'" The fact that the Court measures the "bribe" against the
McCormick standard, without ever addressing the difference between the
$1,000 donation to the campaign and the $7,000 received directly by
Evans may also imply that the quid pro quo should appear in all cases.
B. Congressional Intent Requires the Quid Pro Quo
1. Legislative History
Since the Court appears receptive to re-examining its view of the
statute, the case for the quid pro quo requirement rests upon a
determination of congressional intent. The majority in Evans attempted
to support the requirement by pointing to the common law derivation of
the offense. The Court had little choice but to adopt such a historical
approach because the legislative history on the topic appears sparse and
unenlightening. The phrase "color of official right" merits only one
lengthy mention in the debates over the passage of the Act.45 In it,
Senator Hobbs and others reassured objecting members that the language
of the Act would not inhibit legitimate dues-collecting activities on the
part of union leaders.'" Apart from indicating that the Act's creators
meant for it to reach a fairly high level of corruption, the legislative
history provides little evidence in either direction.
2. Common Law Background
As previously discussed, Congress, in drafting the statute, assigned
the phrase "under color of official right" a meaning drawn from the New
142 United States v. Evans, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889 (1992).
14 Id. at 1899 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
4"Id. at 1889. This response may show a bit of deliberate obtuseness on the part of
the majority. The case mentioned did in fact involve an exchange, but the comment
appears more directed at the "publicness" of the act, rather than at the need for a quid pro
quo. Thus, the statement may simply indicate the unwillingness of the majority to address
the issue and provides only weak support, if any, to the historical argument.




York Penal Code and the common law.47 Unlike the direct legislative
history, the use of the language in early cases may lend some anecdotal
support to the need for a quid pro quo requirement. The majority in
Evans mentioned the early case of Collier v. State as an example.'"
Although the case may not have addressed the issue directly, it, like the
other cases commonly cited in a history of the Act, clearly involved some
exchange; this situation holds true for both the European and early
American decisions.'49 Thus, one could conceivably conclude that the
common law understanding of extortion under color of official right did
include an exercise of power on the part of the official." At the least,
it appears that nothing in the history requires that the courts interpret the
phrase to include the prosecution of low-level corruption. Even under
Edward Coke's definition of bribery, an official could legally accept a fee
of "meat and drink" if of "small value.'' Therefore, a decision to
remove similar offenses from the scope of the Hobbs Act through judicial
interpretation, rather than by prosecutorial discretion, should not run afoul
of the language's background.
3. Comparison with the Federal Bribery Statute
The congressional intent to distinguish bribery from less serious
forms of government corruption becomes clearer when one compares the
Hobbs Act to the statute which Congress enacted to address the
corruption of federal officials. Evans described the crime of extortion
under color of official right as the "rough equivalent of what we would
now call taking a bribe."'" Federal law treats bribery as a serious crime
which warrants harsh punishment. Section 201(b) prohibits the receipt of
a thing of value by a public official in return for influence over the
performance of any official act." As one court explained:
147 See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
, Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1889 n.20 (citing 55 Ala. 125 (1877)).
'4' See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 48, at 837-82; see also Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1896-
97 n.3 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing early cases construing state extortion
statutes).
'5 See United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting that at
common law, extortion occurred when a public official having no entitlement took a fee
"for the performance or nonperformance of an official fiction"), cerl denied, 439 U.S.
1116 (1979).
"' EDwARD COKE, TIE TmD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND
145 (1670).
"2 Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1885.
" 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
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To establish the crime of offering [or accepting] a bribe under
§ 201(b)(1), the government must show that the money was knowingly
offered to an official with the intent and expectation that, in exchange
for the money, some act of a public official would be influenced. The
money must be given with more than "some generalized hope or
expectation of ultimate benefit on the part of the donor."'
Had the fictional delegates in the earlier example served in Congress
rather than a state legislature, Lobbyist would have violated the statute in
his dealings with both Representative and Senator. The statute would
have excused the director of the ballet, however, because she had no
purpose but to build up good wilL In addition, the public official must
have accepted the payment, or the bnber must have offered it,
"corruptly." 55 If the government can prove these elements, the court
may fine the defendant up to three times the value of the corrupt payment
and may imprison him for up to fifteen years, severe penalties similar to
those found in the Hobbs Act.56
The crime of giving or receiving a gratuity, also defined in § 201,
receives much more lenient treatment.' Legislator's acceptance of the
ballet tickets falls into this class of offenses. A public official violates the
gratuities section by receiving anything of value for or because of any
official act otherwise than provided for by law." When compared to
the text of the bribery section, "[p]erhaps the difference in meaning is
slight, but Congress chose different language in which to express
comparable ideas."'5" The bribery section clearly makes necessary an
explicit quid pro quo, while the illegal gratuities section contains no such
requirement."w "It is this element of quid pro quo that distinguishes the
heightened criminal intent requisite under the bribery sections of the
statute from the simple mens rea required for violation of the gratuities
sections.'. 1  Thus, Congress has drawn a distinction between varying
14 United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980) (involving the
prosecution of an agent of the Federal Aviation Administration) (quoting United States
v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976)).
18 U.S.C. § 201(b).
16 Id. § 201(b)(2)(C). The Hobbs Act allows for a fine of $10,000, a twenty-year
prison term, or both. See id. § 1951(a).
'"Id. § 201(c) provides for up to two years in prison and a fine.
1 See id. § 201(c)(1)(B).
159 United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62,72 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (construing the bni
statute in the trial of a United States Senator).
' See id.
1 United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1978) (concerning the bribery
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degrees of official corruption and has chosen the quid pro quo
requirement to separate those crimes warranting severe sanctions from
those justifying a lighter punishment.
Congress intended for § 201, which defines both these offenses, to
serve as a "single comprehensive section of the [c]riminal [c]ode!"'
and to replace a number of existing bribery statutes. According to one
court:
It is apparent from the language of [the gratuities section] that what
Congress had in mind was to protibit an individual, dealing with a
Government employee in the course of his official duties, from giving
the employee additional compensation or atip or gratuity for or because
of an official act already done or about to be done. Section 201(b) [the
bniery section], onthe other hand, is directed against impairment of the
actual and apparent integrity of public life."
In the previous hypothetical, clearly Senator and Representative, who set
aside their duty for personal profit, committed a more serious offense
than Legislator, who only frustrated ballet lovers without tickets. The
federal corruption statute'" achieves its goal by reaching "any situation
in which the judgment of a government agent might be clouded because
of payments or gifts made to him by reason of his position,"65 but it
recognizes degrees of blameworthiness. Had Congress intended for the
Hobbs Act to cover all possible forms of corrupt behavior, a statute
serving this comprehensive purpose already would have existed. If
nothing else, the distinction that Congress saw fit to create in the statute
meant to make "uniform the proscribed acts of bribery as well as the
intent or purpose making them unlawful,"' " illustrates that the Hobbs
Act need not, and should not, extend to the prosecution of gratuities
violations simply because the Court has determined that bribery falls
within its grasp.
conviction of a summer employee of the United States Customs Service).
, S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3852 (1962).
1 United States v. Fenster, 449 F. Supp. 435, 438 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (concerning the
bribery conviction of a United States Veterinarian-Inspector) (quoting United States v.
Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1965)).
164 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
16 United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir.) (involving the gratuities and
bribery prosecution of an employee of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978).
x" S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3856 (1962).
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4. Comparison of Penalties
A comparison of the penalties found in the statutes provides the most
persuasive argument for maintaining the distinction between bribery and
lesser crimes. The Hobbs Act provides for a maximum fine of $10,000
and twenty years in prison." The bribery section applicable to federal
employees carries similar penalties.'" A violation of the gratuities
section, on the other hand, can result in only a two-year maximum
sentence or a fine.'69 Additionally, the bribery section contains a
potential disqualification from public service which has no counterpart in
the gratuities section" Despite this disparity, if one sets aside the quid
pro quo requirement, the elements of accepting a gratuity under 201(c)
and extortion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act appear
"remarkably similar.'' A jury could convict a federal official of
extortion under color of official right or of illegal receipt of gratuities
with evidence that he accepted benefits while knowing that his official
position provided the impetus for these gifts. Yet a federal official is
subject to a twenty-year prison term plus a $10,000 fine under the Hobbs
Act, whereas he might receive at most two years in prison plus a fine if
prosecuted for the same conduct under the gratuities section. It seems
similarly incongruous that a prosecutor may choose to charge a federal
official under a statute imposing a two-year sentence for conduct which
could result in up to twenty years in prison if carried out by a state
official. Although the use of the federal sentencing guidelines should
ameliorate some of the disparity," their presence does not change the
fact that Congress chose to treat these violations separately and used
widely varying penalties to emphasize the distinction.
Apart from the issue of uneven application, attaching such severe
sanctions to behavior involving what Congress obviously considers a low
level of culpability may violate the intent of the federal anti-corruption
scheme. As a result of their unique positions, federal and state officials
receive a great deal of attention, as well as extensive lobbying.
16 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1988).
See id. § 201(b) which provides for a fine of up to three times the value of the
bribe and a prison term of fifteen years.
' Id. § 201(c).
'7o See id. § 201(b).
' United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 691 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the need
to separate bribery under the Hobbs Act from gratuities violations), criticized by Evans
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
72 See infra note 181.
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Arrangements such as that of Jane Smith and Legislator occur commonly.
Eliminating the quid pro quo requirement from the Hobbs Act would
make the receipt by a public official of everything from "a hot-dog from
a street vendor [to] an expense-paid vacation to Disney World,''  to
the innocent acceptance of ballet tickets punishable by a long prison term
and a substantial fine. A single meal accepted without corrupt intent
could theoretically provide the basis for a federal prosecution. "While
other penalties may be appropriate, clearly the Hobbs Act was not meant
to cover such de minimi violations."'" Such a broad "interpretation of
the Hobbs Act would place every public official in jeopardy by virtue of
his status rather than his venal acts"175 and surely would not reflect the
congressional intent to distinguish between lesser and greater culpability
for the two types of behavior.
5. Prosecutorial Discretion Cannot Be
Relied Upon to Make the Necessary Distinction
Prosecutors have attempted to respond to such concerns on the part
of judges by assuring them that "as a matter of prosecutorial discretion,
it would make no sense to attempt to prosecute for... de minimus [sic]
ambiguous conduct.""17 This assurance does not lend itself to a high
comfort level regarding federal prosecutions. In the first place,
prosecutors have shown little hesitation in applying the Hobbs Act to
fairly low level officials.1" In any case, one need not demonstrate that
prosecutors have used the broader interpretation to reach such conduct.
"The fact that ambiguous conduct could be prosecuted under the
[alternative] interpretation raises serious constitutional questions of fair
notice and overbreadth and makes a mockery of the principle that
criminal statutes must be construed strictly with any ambiguity resolved
in favor of lenity."' Without the quid pro quo requirement, the choice
whether to impose a serious penalty on some "routine" conduct while
173 O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 693.
174 United States v. Campo, 774 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1985) (Oakes, J., dissenting)
(arguing against the assertion of federal jurisdiction over the activities of a New York
patrolman).
17 O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 693.
176 Letter, supra note 5.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir.) (sewer inspectors),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035 (1987); Canpo, 774 F.2d 566 (police officers); United States
v. Paschall, 772 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1985) (transportation department officials), cert. demed,
475 U.S. 1119 (1986); O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682 (transit inspectors).
17' See O'Grady, 742 F.2d at 694.
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allowing other equivalent behavior to continue rests solely with a group
of prosecutors. "The evil of selective prosecution is not avoided by the
likelihood that de minimis violations will be overlooked. We remain a
nation of laws rather than of men."'79
C. Policy Considerations Also Support the Quid Pro Quo Requirement
The conclusion that prosecutions under the Hobbs Act require proof
of an .explicit quid pro quo not only reflects congressional intent to
distinguish between the two types of behavior for purposes of punishment
but also proves consistent with sound policy. The requirement restores a
needed proportionality to this area of the law. Congress originally enacted
the Hobbs Act to deal with serious, violent crimes resulting from labor
unrest, and the Act carried correspondingly strict penalties.'
Prosecuting gratuities violations under the Hobbs Act equates them with
not only bribery but forcible extortion and robbery as well. Almost
everyone would agree that when Senator threatened Lobbyist she engaged
in behavior quantifiably different from that of Legislator, yet the penalty
suited to Senator's conduct could technically apply to both. Such a
grouping belittles the gravity of the more serious offenses while eroding
the purpose of distinguishing between different levels of illegal behavior.
When an action which Congress has determined to warrant at most a two-
year sentence can result in the same twenty-year penalty as a violent
crime, the entire principle of tying culpability to punishment
disappears.181 By eliminating gratuities from coverage under the Hobbs
Act, the quid pro quo requirement maintains the integrity of the Act as
well as avoids serious concerns of disproportionate sentencing.
Of course, maintaining proportionality effectively allows many
receipts of gratuities by state officials to go unpunished. Whether because
such arrangements make up a part of business as usual or because they
179 Id.
.30 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
... Of course, the sentencing guidelines may play a role in mitigating against this
result Especially in first offenses, sentences far lower than the maximum will result.
However U.S.S.G. § 2E1.5, the sentencing guideline applicable to the Hobbs Act, refers
one only to § 2Cl., the bnery guideline, which has a base level of ten. It makes no
mention of the gratuities guideline contained in § 2C1.2, which provides for a base level
of only seven. By equating the Hobbs Act with bribery for the purpose of sentencing, the
guidelines apparently assume that the Hobbs Act does not also reach gratuities cases.
Therefore, the guidelines do not have the flexibility necessary to adequately alleviate the




expect reciprocal deference, local prosecutors often prove unwilling to
strictly enforce state ethics rules.12 It is important to note here,
however, that only behavior corresponding to that which Congress
considers relatively minor will escape prosecution. In the hypothetical,
Legislator may get away, but Representative and Senator will not. The
standard remains perfectly capable of capturing those officials who
blatantly sell their offices to the highest bidders. Furthermore, the
potential fear that the quid pro quo presents an impossibly high standard
of proof lacks foundation. In order to satisfy this element, the prosecutors
need not demonstrate that an express agreement existed. Rather, they
must only show that the parties had a "more focused purpose ... than
merely to build a reserve of good will toward [the donor or] his company
on the part of the influential official."'"
By showing that the parties acted with a specific identifiable exercise
of official power in mind, the government removes the offense from the
realm of gratuities without allowing serious criminals to escape liability
simply because they carefully avoid making an express statement of their
intentions. Courts imply agreements quite successfully in other areas of
the criminal law, most notably in proving conspiracies. In conspiracy
prosecutions, "[t]he element of agreement... is nearly always established
by circumstantial evidence, as conspirators seldom make records of their
agreements."'" As in this area, a course of dealing between the parties
may give rise to an inference that repeated payments lead to given
exercises of power. Simply because the offense requires an explicit quid
pro quo does not mean it must contain an express statement of the
bargain struck."85 The fact finder may infer agreements from the parties'
actions, as well as their conversations, in order to furnish a quid pro
quo.'16
It is of no particular significance or consequence that not all the
terms of the understanding were set out on every occasion.... While
"2 See Wbitaker, supra note 1, at 1624.
"3United States v. Fenster, 449 F. Supp. 435, 438 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (concerning the
bribery conviction of a United States Veterinarian-Inspector).
1" United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1119
(1982); see also 16 AM. JUR. 2D. Conspiracy § 42 (1979) ("The existence of... a
criminal conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence, if it
affords a reasonable inference as to the ultimate facts sought to be proved...
(foolnotes omitted).
. See Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889 (1992).
11 See id. at 1884; Short, 671 F.2d at 182-83.
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the Court, as trier of fact, must consider each count separately, what
was said on one occasion has a proper bearing on the question of the
briber's intent on another occasion."
This standard allows federal prosecutors to continue to respond to serious
corruption at the federal and state level, while admittedly leaving smaller,
perhaps ingrained practices to the discretion of local authorities.
Finally, while conceding that gratuities violations require policing,
one must also consider whether the federal government may appropriately
play such a visible and pervasive role in cases involving a relatively
minor degree of local corruption. The publicity attached to such "sting"
operations may make them attractive to ambitious attorneys, but the state
citizens-many of whom have acquiesced in, if not condoned, the
behavior-may question the allocation of so many resources to a crime
which lacks any specific discernible social impact. In fact, in the long
run, federal prosecutions, especially those conducted en masse, may very
well result in nothing but a more subtle refinement of customary
practices. People within the state may view the federal government as an
interloper bent on interfering with the state's business, and they may then
excuse behavior that they otherwise would condemn."s From a different
perspective, the availability of such a powerful enforcement mechanism
may discourage more reform-minded citizens from pursuing change
through state channels. 9  At the very least, the presence of massive
federal investigations demoralizes a state's citizens, resulting in apathy or
a loss of confidence which would probably not occur if the system could
remedy its own ills." While the federal government may properly play
a role in major instances of corruption such as outright bribery, it would
perhaps produce more lasting reform to leave lower-level gratuity
violations to state legal or political processes.19 On the whole, then, the
policy benefits of remaining true to the congressional corruption scheme
outweigh the drawbacks resulting from a less expansive interpretation of
the Hobbs Act.
" Fenster, 449 F. Supp. at 439 n.2.
U Ruff, supra note 6, at 1214. At times, state special prosecutors have taken
responsibility for the investigation of corrupt practices, with limited success. The method
presents one alternative to federal intervention. Id.
It9 Id.
190 Id.
1 See United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1252 n.13 (8th Cir. 1976)
(concerning the gratuities violations of a plumbing inspector).
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D. The Hypothetical Revisited
Consider again the hypothetical state legislature in light of these
concerns. Congress specifically designed the Hobbs Act to deter behavior
such as Senator's and decided that the Act's strict penalties justly
punished the acquisition of property through direct threats. Senator has
engaged in extortion by any definition of the term. Representative has
also committed a serious crime. Before the decision in Evans, some
courts would have exempted her behavior from a Hobbs Act prosecution
because she, unlike Senator, played no part in initiating the transaction.
Evans foreclosed this possibility when it removed the inducement
requirement."9 This approach produces a just result because Congress
has shown its desire to treat the crimes of extortion and bribery as equally
serious, and because in either case the delegate has put her public trust
up for sale. Legislator, on the other hand, did not let the receipt of the
gift control any specific decision. By imposing the quid pro quo
requirement, the courts may separate Legislator's less culpable behavior
from that of the other delegates and accord it the more lenient treatment
that Congress has decided that it deserves.
IV. THE IMPosMON OF THE QuID PRO Quo REQuIREMENT
RAISES FURTHER QuESTIoNs ABOUT THE PROPER ROLE OF
CONGRESS IN REGULATING ETHIcs N STATE GOVERNMENT
Once it is established that the Hobbs Act does not provide a proper
means for prosecuting gratuities violations at the state and local level, one
must ask how best to discourage such conduct. State prosecutors will
often ignore these types of violations, yet most citizens certainly believe
that they merit some consideration. This dilemma raises two important
questions. First, can Congress enact a statute, much like that which
applies to federal officials, to reach gratuities violations involving state
and local officials? Secondly, should Congress do so?
A. Can Congress?
The answer to the first question lies almost certainly in the
affirmative. The courts have a history of giving jurisdictional triggers
based on the Commerce Clause a long reach.193 This foundation, which
12 See supra text aocompanying note 128.
1 See Whitaker, supra note 1, at 1649 n.177.
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removes the necessity of expending federal resources to "uncovering
some fortuitous mailing or other interstate activity on which to base a
conviction,"'" could arguably encompass the receipt of a gratuity by
a state or local official. The Hobbs Act, which rests on the same
jurisdictional grounds, "covers any extortions which in any degree may
reasonably be regarded as affecting commerce."'95 Therefore, bringing
the acceptance of a gratuity within the reach of the proposed statute
requires nothing more than proof of a reasonably probable effect on
commerce, however minimal, as a result of the gift.'96 Although some
have argued that "if the gift is sufficiently modest that it does not deplete
the resources of the giver and elicits no action of any sort in response, it
is unlikely to cause even the modest interference with interstate
commerce that is an essential element of' a crime implicating the
Commerce Clause," no actual impact need exist as long as the act
could have a potential effect.' Given the courts' belief that the federal
government has a role in maintaining the integrity of state and local
officials,'" a challenge based on the jurisdictional trigger of such a
proposed statute would almost certainly fail.
B. Should Congress?
Simply deciding that Congress can enact a statute does not settle the
question of whether Congress should do so. In the absence of a law
specifically addressing the behavior of state and local officials, many
gratuities violations will go unpunished. However, the degree to which
federal investigations could intrude upon the legislative process of the
14Id. at 1649.
United States v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding that the
use of money as a bribe was reasonably calculated to reduce the ability of a construction
company to purchase materials in interstate commerce), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977).
1" See id. (discussing the Hobbs Act).
19 United States v. O'Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 696 (2d Cir. 1984) (Van Graafefland, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), criticized by Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1881 (1992).
'" A violation of the Hobbs Act, and presumably any other statute sharing the same
jurisdictional basis, may be satisfied even if the record demonstrates that the occurrence
had no actual effect on commerce. United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59-60 (7th
Cir.) (noting that congressional concern is justified by the harmful consequences of the
class of transactions to which the individual extortion belongs, and jurisdiction in the
particular case is satisfied by showing a realistic probability that an extortionate
transaction will have some effect on interstate commerce), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837
(1975).
1 See Whitaker, supra note 1, at 1649.
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states-possibly tainting even honest officials, destroying confidence in the
legislative process, and depressing efforts at internal reform-may
outweigh the costs of congressional inaction in this area. Congress may
well decide that the federal government has an overriding interest in
ensuring that the state officials who administer many of its programs and
with whom it must continue to interact display at least a minimum level
of integrity. However, it should make this determination only after an
analysis of all the advantages and drawbacks such a decision would bring.
At this point, it appears that Congress, the courts, and the United States
Department of Justice have adopted the positive stance without making
the necessary investigations.2° Although the ultimate result will likely
remain the same, the ability to point to a well-reasoned process which
brought the law to this conclusion not only increases its actual and
perceived legitimacy, but also has value in and of itself. No matter how
difficult the resolution of these issues appears, it should not discourage
the courts from applying a reasonable analysis to Hobbs Act prosecutions.
Although a more detailed investigation falls beyond the scope of this
Note, these questions warrant further attention.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has provided the perfect opportunity to establish
some common sense guidelines for the federal prosecution of government
corruption at every level. Through its use of the quid pro quo,
McCormick illustrates the means by which the courts may implement
their decision,2 1 while Evans suggests the proper subject-all Hobbs Act
prosecutions.2' Clearly, "[p]ublic officials who passively accept
unauthorized gratuities do not belong in the same class as those who
affirmatively put their office up for sale."2 3 Yet, technically the
language of the Hobbs Act treats them the same and subjects them to the
same penalties. 2 This illogical position suggests that the courts should
refuse to extend the Hobbs Act to cover gratuities violations. Such an
interpretation accurately reflects congressional intent to treat bribery as
a serious crime comparable to robbery or extortion while dealing with
potential or speculative "influencing" of officials in a more lenient
' See id. at 1624. Whitaker goes on to suggest a statute which Congress could adopt
to clarify its stance on low-level conruption in the states. Id. at 1648-53.
,01 See supra notes 95-121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text.
z Whitaker, spra note 1, at 1623.
2 See supra part 11I.B.4.
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manner °5 The enactment of a separate statute which assigns bribery a
severe penalty but punishes the acceptance of a gratuity with much
smaller consequences illustrates this perspective.2" While the stricter
penalties of the Hobbs Act provide appropriate punishment for public
officials who allow the possibility of private gain to dictate the exercise
of their duties, they disproportionately punish those officials who look
upon gifts as the fringe benefits of their office while offering nothing
specific in return for them. The imposition of the quid pro quo
requirement presents the most suitable way to achieve the proportionality
lacking in this area of the law.
With the proposed limitation provided by the imposition of a quid pro
quo requirement for Hobbs Act prosecutions comes the danger that the
states will choose to ignore gratuities violations, leaving them unchecked
by any outside mechanism. However, the courts' possible perception of
a need to which Congress has not spoken cannot provide justification for
distorting a statute beyond all recognition to fill that void. Congress
intended the Hobbs Act to apply to violent crimes and those egregious
displays of public corruption which interfere with the orderly functioning
of society. Congress indicated this intent when it established a scheme of
penalties appropriate for some of the most serious of offenses. If
Congress wishes to address less culpable forms of behavior also deserving
condemnation but not equaling the first group in venality or effect, then
Congress may exercise that option. Until that time, however, the courts
will serve society far better if they remain true to the logic established by
Congress by refusing to extend the Hobbs Act to encompass crimes for
which its creators never intended it.
Medrith Lee Hager
See supra part IM.B.4.
2" See supra part II.B.3.
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